170426 00The Information and Consulting Company Defence Express and The Research Centre of Modern Conflicts are starting up the section "HYPOCRISY" which includes a series of publications on the research "HYPOCRISY AND FRAUD as the pillars of an aggressive Russian foreign policy."

 

In the section "HYPOCRISY", the authors will expose the tools used by the Kremlin to spread its own destructive influence, both on the population of the Russian Federation, and on specific groups of people around the world.

 

Typically, the word HYPOCRISY is understood as "a behavior that covers insincerity, malice, supposed sincerity, virtue ..." - one of the effective methods of combating hypocrisy is the methodological and thorough revelation of true intentions and the goals of the hypocrite.

 

We are confident that sooner or later, the HYPOCRISY of the current political structure in the Russian Federation will become clear to everyone, including those that currently are being effectively “hypnotized”.

 

The more the information released, the sooner a large proportion of people will be able to escape from the “somnambulist” state, the source of which is the HYPOCRISY of the Kremlin demagogues. So, we invite those who are confident in the importance of this mission and the necessary professional knowledge, skills and abilities, to be included among the authors of the " HYPOCRISY".

 

There is a lot of redundancy in these three "paragraphs" considering how short they are I could rewrite them as one paragraph that more concisely and effectively communicates the message

 

Together we will fight the darkness!

 

Today, under the heading " HYPOCRISY", we publish the first material of the series written by the specialists of The Research Centre of Modern Conflicts, "EXPERIENCE OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE: SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND MILITARY OPERATIONS"

 

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To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.

Sun-Tzu. The Art of War.

According to the modern standards of planning and implementation of power scenarios (in the internal or external “theater” of confrontation), the forced transition from the format of a special operation into a format of military operation is considered a failure.

Military expert

 

 Military operations and special operations - force formats of the empire's actions

 

On the basis of studying and analyzing the rich material provided during the previous decades by the Russian military-political mechanism in the course of its almost continuous practical activity in favor of preserving and retaining (or returning) imperial assets, it is possible to draw the conclusions about certain features of the main power formats of the following actions: military and a special operation.

 

At the same time, we can define a military operation fairly satisfactorily as a "form of conducting military operations by operational or strategic unions of the armed forces; a set of coordinated and interrelated goals, tasks, places and times of concurrent and consistent actions conducted under a unified plan. "

 

Unlike the previous one, the term "special" operation is harder to be satisfactorily exhaustive defined (we will not take into consideration the widespread examples of its definition as "coordinated actions of the forces of special operations", that is, the definition of the term through itself, which does not give a practical result). The practical experience of the implementation of "special" operations indicates that this term is usually understood as a complex of "non-military" means, forms and methods used for compulsory achievement set goals and objectives by the state (at the strategic level) or military unit (at the tactical level).

 

In the context of current realities, the spectrum of such forms should include measures in the field of political, economic, informational (propagandistic), social and psychological confrontation. A distinctive feature that distinguishes the fact of the actual implementation of the "special operations" in these areas (as opposed to the traditional competitive interaction between states or individual associations) is the ignorance of any "norms", "mutual arrangements", "rules of the game" that consist of historical perspective in world practice. On the contrary, the striking factor in this case is the "shock" that occurs as a result of an unexpected excess, a sudden crossing of any "red lines", the established framework and rules of mutual behavior.

 

Thus, a special operation is always COMPLEX, combining all components of influence: special (agent-operational, operational-technical, informational or propagandistic), economic, political, social, military - in the ratio necessary for a particular operation. In this case, the highest achievement in the planning and implementation of a special operation is the absence or insignificant presence of a military component in its pure form. The very need for hidden (legendary) or open involvement of large military formations for their direct purpose (that is, for warfare), which was not previously foreseen by the plans of measures, follows from the fact that: a.) the actual operation itself did not achieve its goals in such areas (or in one of the spheres) as a military, political, economic or b.) one of the components of this special operation did not work.

 

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The occupation and annexation of the Crimea is a vivid example of a special operation

 

An example of a successful tactical plan for a special operation is the campaign of occupation and annexation of the Crimea, which actually began in the early 2000s with the creation of informational, political, economic, advocacy and support, and the maintenance and strengthening of the necessary level of quantitative indicators and combat readiness of the military component both on the territory of the peninsula, and in the immediate operational-tactical proximity.

 

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The occupation campaign and the annexation of the Crimea actually began in the early 2000s with the creation of an informational, political, economic, advocacy framework. In the photo: (2006) The gates of the port of Feodosiya are blocked by pro-Russian political parties and public organizations in order to prevent the carrying out of the exercises "C-Breeze-2006".

 

Objects of operational development were selected correctly, operational measures were carried out both on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and in relation to the central authorities of Ukraine, special services and other law enforcement agencies (including the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine), the SZRU (The Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine), the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Armed Forces). The senior and middle level executives were involved in the secret cooperation, as well as ordinary executives. In some cases, the implementation was introduced (infiltration) to these units (the “special” characteristic feature of this activity was that it was conducted under the current Treaty on Friendship and cooperation between the two countries, signed protocols and agreements between the special services of Ukraine and Russia about the inadmissibility of actions against the interests of the states parties.).

 

This ensured that significant operational measures were subsequently implemented. For example, blocking or limiting, and in some cases, the complete disconnection of communication facilities of the Crimean authorities and subdivisions with the country's central management "on the mainland", blocking, disrupting local communications networks (taking them under control, providing interception or distortion of important information on existing communication channels); providing control over airspace, key objects of public administration, authorities of the financial and banking system; blocking the activity of the headquarters and military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

 

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 Early preparation, including implemented operational and operational measures, allowed the RF to provide effective control over airspace, key objects of the government, financial and banking system authorities; blocking the activity of the headquarters and military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

 

According to preliminary estimates, as a result of systematic recruitment and propaganda work, about 65-70% of the personnel of the territorial units of the SBU in Crimea went to the side of the enemy, taking an oath of allegiance to the Russian Federation. Joint efforts of the FSB, SZR, GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) of the Russian Federation were carried out mass recruitment of the deputy corps of the Crimea, local staff involved in cooperation, which disseminated information favorable to the Russian aggressor among the population.

 

Earlier, a reserve corps of "leaders" prepared in case of a seizure of power, which created the illusion of "organization and order" from the local population in the process of establishing an occupying power.

 

During the preparatory period, a network of pro-Russian parties, public associations and organizations headed by Moscow-led leaders - various "Russian societies", "Russians in exile", "native harbors", "Rodini", and others like that will be created and legalized. The representative offices of the Russian radical movements, led by recruited agents and staff members of the Russian intelligence services (mostly from the 5th Office of the FSB of Russia, the so-called "intelligence from the territory") openly operated on the territory of the peninsula.

 

Particular attention was paid to the incitement of "anti-Tatar" sentiments and diverse myths among the local Russian-speaking population, as well as in the leading state bodies of Ukraine. The "antiterrorist" hysteria (for example, around the Tatar "Hizb-ut-Tahrir") was actively engaged, with rumors of Turkey's intentions to use the Tatar factor for the Crimean integration, etc.

 

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 Particular attention was paid to the incitement of "anti-Tatar" sentiments and various myths among the local Russian-speaking population, as well as in the leading state organs of Ukraine. October 2013 - “Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami” International Forum artificially transformed into a rally and marginalized.

 

It can be argued that the preliminary measures for carrying out the special operation "Annexation" were implemented in advance, massively and qualitatively, although sometimes not entirely unconstrained, taking into account that the central authorities of the country in Kiev also successfully filtered agents and staff members of various special services and power agencies of the Russian Federation.

 

On the territory of the peninsula, as well as in a close operational environment (Rostov region, Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories of the Russian Federation), detachments of combat operational groups were created (selected, formed, trained, motivated and illended). The transfer of additional human resources from the locations of long-distance dislocation (Leningrad Region, Upper Volga and Don, Urals, Siberia, Far East) was also provided. They were sent to Crimea in the guise of "Cossacks", "patriots", private individuals and public associations. Under such coverings, in particular, Russian military personnel, as well as special appointments from the FSB, the GRU and the SZR of the Russian Federation were transferred to Kerch and Feodosia.

 

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Units of combat operational groups were sent on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea under the guise of "Cossacks", "patriots",

private individuals and public associations

 

A characteristic feature of special operations carried out by the special services of Russia (as, indeed, the former USSR) is the active creation, support and use of criminal groups, which almost always have contacts with Russian organized criminal groups, or rather, controlled by Russian organized crime. If there is no such control, it is created artificially, as happens in Spain, Portugal, the Balkans (Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Greece), in both south and north France, and in the Baltic states. If there is no direct control, Russian special services operate through the international organized crime groups - for example, the Colombian and Nigerian drug mafia.

 

However, Crimea had its own criminal groups, whose leaders took an active part in the so-called "Crimean Spring" in 2014, and now they occupy leading positions in local (city and district) and republican occupation "authorities and administration". This applies, in particular, to the key occupying Crimean "administrators" - Aksenova and Konstantinov.

 

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A characteristic feature of special operations carried out by the special services of Russia (as, indeed, the former USSR) is the active creation, support and use of criminal groups, which almost always have contacts with Russian organized criminal groups. Crimea has its own criminal groups, whose leaders took an active part in the so-called "Crimean Spring" in 2014, and now they occupy leading positions in local (city and district) and republican occupation "authorities and administration".

 

Organized criminal groups controlled by Russian "thieves in the law" (from Rostov-na-Donu, Moscow, Voronezh, Novorossiysk) were also actively used in the preparation and conduct of a special operation to seize power in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. In particular, criminology was actively used to suppress and conquer the representatives of local authorities, military leaders, public figures (earlier, in Crimea they abducted military commanders, intimidated then legitimate representatives of local authorities and deputies).

 

It can be argued that the Russian special operation in Crimea was carried out - in terms of agent-operational, operative-technical, informational-propaganda, and military support - impeccably. Due to this, the special operation did not turn into a large-scale military battle (as subsequently happened on the Donbass). The military component of the special operation was implemented at a pretty high level (which enabled Russia to support its military operation in Syria through the Crimea). During the implementation of a successful tactical special operation (seizure and annexation of Crimea) false long-range operational as well as strategic political, economic and social forecasts were made. At the same time, national interests were affected by the negative consequences of this operation not only on the occupied territories of the Crimea, but on the other regions of the Russian Federation, too.

 

Conclusions:

 

The failure to carry out a special operation (the failure of the operation) leads to its transfer to a military conflict (to the military stage), while local special operations, on the contrary, become a part of a military operation, as it is now taking place in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk districts.

 

Translation: RCMC

 

You can find this article in Ukrainian here: ЛИЦЕМІРСТВО: ДОСВІД РОСІЙСЬКОЇ АГРЕСІЇ ПРОТИ УКРАЇНИ

 

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Translation

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