rus hung0While the case with France or Italy is more or less clear:  there is just business and "historical ties" and nothing personal there, but the case with Greece and Hungary is a vivid fact of KGB hostage countries, to which its favourite proven tactics has been applied for decades: bribery and blackmail.

 

 

In particular, in the early 2016 the Russian media announced the Hungarian Ministry of Defence intention to purchase from Russia about 30 Mi-8/17 multi-purpose helicopters at $ 400 million approximately. (http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20160122/1363360044.html) What makes Budapest take the risk of buying military equipment from Russia in violation of the EU sanctions?

 

There are both objective and subjective reasons for that. For example, no one doubts that the Hungarian army does need helicopters, because at present it does not have a single combat-ready helicopter. Not a single one. For this matter, Hungary does not fulfil its obligations to establish a helicopter wing in the interests of NATO and is being criticized for it within the framework of the Alliance. There is also no doubt that the lack of multi-purpose helicopters prevents from the further development of the Hungarian Special Operations Forces despite the fact that the government declares the priority of this armed forces component.

 

In spite of this, the Hungarian government has already demonstrated inconsistency in the implementation of the helicopter project, pulling the wool over the US and European manufacturers' eyes. By mid-2015, the Hungarian government announced positive plans for procurement of new helicopters at about $ 600 million and named two preferable companies – Augusta Westland and Sikorsky. However, in the middle of 2015 the government abruptly cancelled the plans to purchase new helicopters because of the lack of necessary funds. The Western partners of Hungary were far from pleased with that.

 

Another aspect pressing the Hungarian government: Russia is extremely annoyed by the inconsistency of the Hungarian government, due to problems with the implementation of the project for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Hungary. Despite the fact that the Hungarian President Viktor Orban has already appropriated a part of Russian funds intended for the project and personally promised to Putin that the project will be implemented without any problems, the EU now claims that the contract is contrary to EU legislation and is blocking its execution.

 

As a result, Orban has problems with both NATO, and the EU, and Russia. Although, actually, the Hungarian president feels a real threat from Putin, who has incriminating evidence against him including the information on business interests of Orban's entourage in Russia and can easily push the Hungarian Prime Minister to the wall.

 

Among other things, the Russian president, in his KGB manner, has already hinted to Orban about possible problems in the future, as he published the information about the Hungarian delegation's visit to Moscow in the opposition press. A kind of signal to his Hungarian partner, that the Kremlin may provide money both to the ruling party and the opposition.

 

It is because of this zugzwang that Orban tries to prove his loyalty to Putin. The purchase of helicopters can be a good compensation. Because there are considerable political implications in the helicopter deal, and it is very appreciated by Putin.

 

Although it is possible that this helicopter deal, which will most likely be also blocked by the EU, is yet another Orban's attempt to gain time. If the current trends in the economic situation development in Russia continue and hopes of the majority of civilized countries come true and Putin's regime collapses, then Viktor Orban has a chance to get away without fulfilling obligations to the Kremlin and avoiding penalties from the EU.

 

For his part, Putin will try to hook the Hungarian prime minister with another hook and force him to sign the helicopter deal. After all, if Hungary really buys Russian helicopters, it will be a success for the Kremlin both politically (destruction of the EU sanction regime and demonstration of conducting business as usual with European countries, in spite of the occupation of Ukrainian territories), and economically. Hungary has no money to purchase the helicopters, and it is unlikely to appear. Russia may provide a loan to Orban to buy Russian helicopters and drag him into another financial trap. And, of course, the Russian propaganda will declare about intensification of "corrosion of Euro-Atlantic solidarity" and "strengthening allied relations between Russia and Hungary", which is Putin's main strategic goal.

 

Another example of strong positions of KGB in an EU member state and the way the Europeans are seeking to resolve the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict and "force the aggressor to observe the international law" is presented by Greece. In mid-January 2016, the Parliament of this country ratified the agreement with Russia on the supply of military products.

 

This document is a conceptual one and defines the order and the general conditions of supply and protection of intellectual property. It says that the military equipment and any information supplied to the Greek party under this agreement, shall be used exclusively for the needs of the armed forces of the Hellenic Republic, cannot be re-exported, resold or transferred to third parties without the written consent of Russia. The agreement is concluded for five years from the date of its entry into force and shall be automatically extended for subsequent periods of five years unless either party notifies its intention to terminate it.

 

It should be noted that the Agreement was signed back on December 3, 2013, but its ratification was delayed due to the change of government in Greece. But when sincere "friends of Putin" came to power in the country, the ratification of the Agreement was merely a matter of time.

 

In order to better understand how an EU and NATO member country can so freely trade with the aggressor, who made the Alliance launch a major campaign of enhancing their own defence capabilities and rearmament, we should familiarize ourselves with the Greek decision-makers who today define the political course of the country.

 

The ruling party now, the left-wing populist party SYRIZA, was founded as a coalition of left-wing and radical left-wing parties. In due time, its leader and now Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, during his official visit to Moscow on the invitation of the Russian government, criticized the Western policy towards Ukraine, and expressed support for the separatist referendums, which were held on its occupied territories. In addition, he also termed Ukraine as "neo-Nazi" and urged the EU not to recognize the Ukrainian authorities.

 

The same opinion regarding Ukraine is held by the Greek Defence Minister Panos Kammenos, who at the same time is the leader of the right-wing, national-conservative, populist and Eurosceptic party "Independent Greeks", which has formed a ruling coalition with the aforementioned "SYRIZA". In particular, in an interview with the Russian Gazeta.ru, he stated the following: "The Greek population in the Crimea was assaulted by the fascist government of Ukraine and the Russian forces present there served as the protection of Greek families."

 

Another representative of the Greek government, Nikos Kotzias, a former member of the Greek Communist Party, and now the current Minister of Foreign Affairs in the cabinet of Tsipras, is known for his contacts with Russia's leading fascist ideologist Alexander Dugin. A Russian expert on European extremely right-wing movements, Anton Shekhovtsov, now staying in Vienna, recently wrote: "In 2013, Nikos Kotzias invited Dugin to speak at the University of Piraeus on the topic" International Politics and the Eurasian vision". In his lecture, Dugin indirectly suggested that instead of leaving the EU and joining the Russian-led Eurasian Union, Greece should remain in the EU in order to promote pro-Russian vision of international politics".

 

The above facts are very important, since they clearly demonstrate what Greece is actually doing nowadays, in particular buying weapons from the aggressor, and who promotes such a policy.

 

It should be added that Greece managed to arm itself with Russian ships and S-300 air defence missiles. It seems that the Greeks want to buy more Russian weapons. And, perhaps, like Hungarians they will do it with Putin's money as they do not have much of their own, and the EU will not provide a single Euro for this, but can also deal them a good smacking.

 

If speaking of Russia, there is nothing strange in such its actions, since if the President and his entourage, who hold key positions in the country, came from KGB and have long been practising such methods in the domestic policy, the country's foreign policy cannot but be the same. And it makes little difference whether it is the diplomatic relations, or cooperation in the energy sector, or, as in this case, the MTC.

 

As for its victims, Greece and Hungary, had they not been the members of both the EU and NATO, their desire to get into the Russian trap could at least be understandable. However, now they are members of both these organizations and their actions cause much harm to each of them.

 

On the one hand, these countries should fulfil NATO requirements to improve their defence capabilities (which, in particular, were stated during the February meeting of NATO defence ministers), however, they do not have the money for the expensive weapons produced by their partners in the Alliance. On the other hand, being aware of such problems, Russia invites them to take to their weapon needle, and thereby drives a wedge into the NATO collective security system. Because, if there may not be a significant problem with Russian small arms or the above mentioned helicopters, with S-300 systems, however, at least two questions arise: can the Greek S-300 be fully integrated into the unified NATO air defence system and can these S-300, if necessary, be aimed at Russian missiles and other air targets?

 

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